The Governance Paradox: Preferences of Small Vulnerable Firms in the Homebuilding Industry
研究了住宅建筑行业中小型脆弱企业在高资产频率下选择准一体化而非纵向一体化的驱动因素，发现资产专用性、议价能力和机会主义预期是关键，揭示了企业同时追求效率与制度合法性的悖论。
This article explores the variables that drive small firms to choose quasi–integration as an alternative to vertical integration in situations of high asset frequency. Drawing on transaction cost theory and institutional approaches, we develop and test several hypotheses regarding quasi–integration among homebuilders and land developers in a major Canadian city. Our focus is on the preferences of small, vulnerable firms operating in an environment where quasi–integration has been institutionalized as a trusted form of governance. The findings indicate that the preference for quasi–integration is driven by asset specificity, bargaining power, and opportunistic expectations, supporting a paradoxical view that small, vulnerable firms pursue both efficiency and institutional legitimacy in making governance choices regarding large dominant suppliers.