The Effects of Firm Optimizing Behaviour in Matching Models
扩展了匹配模型，假设失业工人比企业更了解自身平均生产率，导致工资随失业时长下降，解释了失业的疤痕效应和灰心工人效应。
This paper considers a matching model of which the search behaviour of Jovanovic (1979) and Albrecht and Jovanovic (1984) are special cases. The nature of the generality is that each unemployed worker has more information than firms about his average productivity. This results in wage offers falling over the length of an unemployment spell because a long spell is a signal of lower than average productivity. The results of the paper are similar to the scarring effect of Heckman and Borjas (1980) and Greenwald (1986) and the discouraged worker effect of Schweitzer and Smith (1974).