Kindness, confusion, or ... ambiguity?
研究模糊性厌恶如何解释自愿贡献机制中的超额贡献，通过实验比较风险与模糊情境下人类与虚拟对手的博弈，发现模糊性影响贡献但态度受纳什均衡位置影响。
Abstract Other-regarding preferences or decision errors are the main explanations put forward to justify contributions exceeding the non-cooperative optimum in VCM games. An alternative rationale relies on ambiguity aversion. Ambiguity aversion increases the perceived marginal benefit of own contributions, which in equilibrium will exceed the Nash level. We present a series of experiments testing this hypothesis. To control for other-regarding preferences, we run a two-player game in which a human player plays with a virtual agent. Players are assigned either to a risky setting (known probabilities of opponent's choices) or to an ambiguity setting (probabilities of opponent's contribution are vague). Results show that ambiguity affects contributions. However, attitude to ambiguity appears to be affected by the location of the aggregate Nash optimum inside the decision space.