Corporate Debt Maturity Policy and Investor Tax-Timing Options: Theory and Evidence
研究公司债务期限政策如何影响投资者通过买卖公司证券来避税的机会，发现长期债务能最大化这种税收时机价值，且利率波动越大、期限结构越陡，公司越倾向于延长债务期限。实证支持了利率波动的影响。
This paper argues that corporate debt maturity policy affects investor tax-timing options to tax-trade corporate securities. In a multiperiod model with interest rate uncertainty, we establish that a long-term debt maturity strategy maximizes investor tax-timing option value. The analysis predicts that the firm lengthens debt maturity as interest rate volatility increases and as the slope of the term structure increases. Empirical analysis supports the model's interest rate volatility prediction.