The Enforcement of Public Price Controls
提出一个理论模型，认为价格管制者会在压低价格的支持与无谓损失的反对之间权衡，从而决定不同行业的执行力度，并用1971-74年美国价格管制数据验证了该理论。
Price controls differ across industries systematically as predicted by the theory regulators maximize political support. This approach views the price controllers as choosing, subject to technology and budget constraints, the appropriate enforcement to balance the support from holding down prices against the opposition from dead-weight loss. Differences in enforcement depend on weights in the official price index, elasticities of supply and demand, and structural characteristics of industries. Data from the 1971-74 regime of price controls are used to test the theory. The empirical evidence clearly shows the predicted differences in price controls for a cross section of industries.