Relationship-Specific Investments and Earnings Management: Evidence on Corporate Suppliers and Customers
研究企业与供应商和客户的关系如何影响盈余管理，发现关系专用性投资越强，企业越可能操纵盈余，但这种操纵会缩短合作关系。
ABSTRACT: We examine the determinants and consequences of earnings management by firms in the context of their relationships with suppliers and customers. We find that industry-level proxies for relationship-specific investments by suppliers/customers are positively associated with the magnitude of discretionary accruals, volatility of earnings, and the frequency of large earnings increases. We also find that firm-level proxies for the intensity of relationship-specific investments by actual suppliers are positively related to the magnitude of discretionary accruals. In addition, earnings management by the firm in one period is positively related to the magnitude of R&D investments by suppliers and customers in the next period. However, we find that earnings management adversely affects the duration of customer-supplier relationships. Overall, our findings suggest that earnings management is used opportunistically to influence the perception of suppliers/customers about the firm’s prospects.