Optimal Offer Strategies in Mergers and Acquisitions*
将企业并购过程建模为确定性条件下的讨价还价博弈，推导出买方在不确定目标股东最低接受价格时的最优出价策略，策略依赖于最低接受价格的概率分布。
ABSTRACT This paper models the corporate takeover process as a bargaining game under certainty. During the takeover process, an acquirer is generally uncertain about the minimum price the target shareholders will accept. Normally, a takeover is concluded after a sequence of offers have been made. This paper derives optimal offer strategies for the buyer at each stage of this bargaining game under uncertainty. Uncertainty about the target's minimum acceptable price is represented by a probability distribution. Optimal offer strategies depend on the probability distribution of the minimum acceptable price, which can change during the offer process.