In-Concert Overexpansion and the Precautionary Demand for Bank Reserves
指出，即使没有公众提取高能货币，协同行动的封闭银行系统也可能因预防性储备需求而面临储备短缺，挑战了流行的协同过度扩张理论，对取消银行货币竞争性供给的法律限制的稳定性担忧提出了质疑。
Economists have long believed that, absent any public withdrawals of high-powered money, an unregulated, closed banking system can expand its assets and liabilities without encountering any shortage of reserves so long as its members act in concert. Notwithstanding its popularity, this inconcert overexpansion doctrine is inconsistent with standard theories of the precautionary demand for bank reserves. Unless these theories are themselves incorrect, concerns that complete removal of legal restrictions on the competitive supply of bank money must result in an unstable or indeterminate bank-money multiplier are misplaced.