Relying on the Information of Interested Parties
研究利益相关方通过提供可验证信息影响决策者时，竞争是否总能揭示全部相关信息。发现决策者的战略成熟度和信息充分性会影响竞争的效果，在某些情况下竞争并非必要或充分。
We investigate the conventional wisdom that competition among interested parties attempting to influence a decisionmaker by providing verifiable information elicits all relevant information. We find that, if the decisionmaker is strategically sophisticated and well informed about the relevant variables and about the preferences of the interested party or parties, competition may be unnecessary to achieve this result. If the decisionmaker is unsophisticated or not well informed, competition is not generally sufficient. If the interested parties' interests are sufficiently opposed, however, or if the decisionmaker is seeking to advance the parties' welfare, then competition can reduce or even eliminate the decisionmaker's need for prior knowledge about the relevant variables and for strategic sophistication. In other settings only the combination of competition among information providers and a sophisticated skepticism is sufficient to allow effective decisionmaking.