Audit Committee, Board Characteristics, and Auditor Switch Decisions by Andersen's Clients*
基于821家安达信客户的数据，研究审计委员会和董事会特征如何影响客户在安达信声誉受损后更换审计师的时机和选择，发现更独立、财务专家更多的审计委员会和更大、更独立的董事会更早解聘安达信，且更可能选择四大作为继任审计师。
Using a sample of hand-collected data on 821 firms, which dismissed Arthur Andersen as their auditor between October 15, 2001 and August 31, 2002, we investigate the role of audit committees and boards of directors in the auditor switch decisions by Andersen's clients. This provides a unique setting to examine auditor choice in a situation where the auditor's reputation is clearly tarnished. We investigate the impact of (a) audit committee size, independence, activity, financial expertise; and (b) board size and board independence on the timing of dismissal and choice of successor auditors by Andersen's clients. We find that firms with more independent audit committees, audit committees with greater financial expertise, and larger and more independent boards dismissed Andersen earlier. We also find that firms with larger and more active audit committees as well as more independent boards were more likely to choose a Big 4 successor auditor. We thus contribute to the understanding of the role of audit committees and boards of directors in the auditor switch decisions.