Testing Bureaucratic Influence on Local School Expenditures by Comparing Survey and Expenditure Data
提出一种检验不完全官僚权力的方法，通过比较微观调查与政府支出数据中的成本弹性和一次性援助边际支出倾向，对密歇根州205个非都市学区进行实证检验，结果支持不完全官僚权力的存在。
Previous empirical studies of bureaucratic power have employed testing procedures that are sensitive only to complete bureaucratic power in which the bureaucrat is able to force an all or nothing choice on his legislative sponsor. This paper suggests a test for incomplete bureaucratic power in which micro-based, survey estimates of the cost elasticity of demand and marginal propensity to spend out of lump-sum aid are compared with estimates of these same parameters taken from governmental expenditure studies. Empirical tests with 205 non-SMSA school districts in Michigan yield results that are consistent with incomplete bureaucratic power. Copyright 1991 by MIT Press.