The gift of advice: communication in a bilateral gift exchange game
在标准双边礼物交换游戏中加入员工发送消息的环节，发现消息不影响努力水平但显著提高工资，因为员工建议经理提高工资并承诺更高努力，经理通过尝试学习到提高工资能增加收益。
Abstract We augment a standard bilateral gift exchange game so employees can send messages at the same time as choosing an effort level. Employee effort (controlling for wages) is unaffected by allowing messages, but wages dramatically increase. Messages affect wages because employees give managers advice to set higher wages, usually explaining that this will result in higher effort. This advice prompts managers to try higher wages, helping them learn that raising wages increases their payoffs. In a follow-up experiment, we directly provide managers with additional information about the relationship between wages and effort. This too causes wages to increase, but to a lesser extent than allowing messages. Our results highlight the critical role of learning in generating gains from positive gift exchange.