The Trade-Off Between Financial Resources and Agency Costs in the Family Business: An Exploratory Study
结合资源基础观和代理理论，分析家族企业保持家族控制如何影响其财务资源和代理成本，并发现第一代与后代加入后企业的不同特征。
This exploratory study is intended to analyze how a combination of the resources-based view and agency theory can provide a better understanding of the internal dynamic of the family business and its evolution. Our evidence seems to suggest that the desire to keep family control produces specific sources of value and conditions the firm's financial capacity to acquire resources. These peculiarities change between first and following generations. During the first generation, we find that less severe agency costs balance the negative effect of scarce financial structure on the family firm's value. After descendants join the firm, the increasing agency costs are compensated by the enlargement of the firm's financial structure.