Compensation and Transfer Pricing in a Principal-Agent Model
研究存在道德风险和私人信息的委托代理模型中，最优补偿机制和转移定价设计，发现委托人应创建内部市场并对投入品征税或补贴，且最优补偿函数可分解为仅依赖产出的非线性收入函数和仅依赖投入量的非线性转移定价函数之差。
This paper studies transfer prices and compensation mechanisms in a principal-agent model with moral hazard and private information by the agent. Production requires unobservable effort by the agent and a purchased input. In general, it is optimal for the principal to create an internal market for the input and charge the agent a tax or subsidy that differs from the market price. Conditions are found under which the optimal compensation function is given by the difference between a nonlinear revenue function depending only on output and a nonlinear transfer pricing function that depends only on the amount of the purchased input. Copyright 1991 by Economics Department of the University of Pennsylvania and the Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association.