扩展式博弈中的演绎推理

Deductive Reasoning in Extensive Games

Economic Journal · 2003
被引 28
人大 AABS 4

中文导读

提出一个基于谨慎、完全相信对手理性、无额外信念限制的演绎推理模型,应用于扩展式博弈,得出新的经济洞见,支持前向归纳而不必然支持逆向归纳。

Abstract

We justify the application to extensive games of a model of deductive reasoning based on three key features: 'caution', 'full belief of opponent rationality', and 'no extraneous restrictions on beliefs'. We apply the model to several examples, and show that it yields novel economic insights. The approach supports forward induction, without necessarily promoting backward induction.

谨慎对手理性信念无外部限制前向归纳