Inequality and Inefficiency in Joint Projects
一群代理人自愿参与联合项目，其努力不完全可替代，产出按给定份额分配。研究发现，当努力替代弹性≤2时，只有完全平等的份额向量不可改进，其他向量可通过洛伦兹支配改进；弹性更高时，完全平等不再不可改进。揭示了不平等与集体行动的联系。
\nA group of agents voluntarily participates in a joint project, in which efforts are not perfectly substitutable. The output is divided according to some given vector of shares. A share vector is unimprovable if no other share vector yields a higher sum of payoffs. When the elasticity of substitution across efforts is two or lower, only the perfectly equal share vector is unimprovable, and all other vectors can be improved via Lorenz domination. For higher elasticities of substitution, perfect equality is no longer unimprovable. Our results throw light on the connections between inequality and collective action.\n