Insurability and Moral Hazard in Agricultural Insurance Markets
研究全风险保险合同的最优设计，分析竞争性保险市场的形成条件，并探讨道德风险对农业保险赔偿方案的影响，发现道德风险下更低的免赔额能激励农民采取适当行动。
Abstract Pareto‐optimal and constrained Pareto‐optimal all‐risk insurance contracts are studied. Conditions required for emergence of competitive insurance markets are isolated and discussed. Full insurance contracts are shown to be dominated by contracts involving coinsurance and deductibles if insurers are pseudo‐risk averse. The effect of moral hazard on all‐risk agricultural insurance indemnity schedules is examined. Results for indemnity schedules under moral hazard and constant absolute risk aversion show that providing farmers with the incentives to take appropriate actions may imply lower deductibles in the presence of moral hazard than in the absence of moral hazard.