On the Design of Optimal Insurance Policies Under Manipulation of Audit Cost
刻画了在保单持有人可虚报损失且审计成本可被操纵时，最优保险契约的特征：外生审计成本下免赔额最优；审计成本可操纵时审计师应获或有费用；审计师风险厌恶时最优契约含共保，极度厌恶时设赔付上限。
This article characterizes optimal insurance policies under deterministic auditing in a situation where the policyholders can misrepresent their losses. Under exogenous audit cost, a straight deductible is optimal when the policyholders can inflate their claims by intentionally increasing the damages. If policyholders can manipulate the audit cost and the insurer is unable to observe the cost incurred by his or her auditor, then the auditor should receive contingent fees. When the auditor is risk‐averse, the optimal insurance policy involves some degree of coinsurance. An upper limit on coverage is optimal when the auditor is infinitely risk‐averse.