The Exploitation of Relationships in Financial Distress: The Case of Trade Credit
研究企业间依赖关系如何影响商业信用的定价和债务谈判，发现依赖型债权人会做出更多让步，导致财务不稳定企业更偏好商业信用并支付更高利率。
This paper develops optimal pricing, lending, and renegotiation strategies for companies in relationships where one firm is highly dependent on the other. Long‐term trade—creditor firm relationships induce dependent trade creditors to grant more concessions in debt renegotiations than nondependent creditors. Anticipating these larger renegotiation concessions, not only do less financially stable firms prefer trade credit, but all firms agree to pay a higher interest rate for trade credit. The model also explains the existence of “teaser” interest rates and convenience classes. Findings are consistent with those of the relationship‐lending literature.