Nonfinancial Goals, Governance, and Dividend Payout in Private Family Firms
基于501家比利时私营家族企业数据，研究发现家族CEO或家族主导的董事会倾向于低股利支付，且这种倾向在早期代际阶段更强，表明非财务目标影响融资决策。
This article uses insights from behavioral economics to explain dividend policy in private family firms. Based on a sample of 501 Belgian firms, our results indicate that dividend payout is low when a family CEO leads the business and in the presence of a family dominated board. The tendency of a family CEO or family dominated board to retain earnings appears to be stronger in earlier generational stages compared to later generational stages. The findings are consistent with (i) socioemotional objectives being important drivers of funding decisions in private firms where families possess important decision and control power and (ii) these objectives being more predominant in early generational stages.