Commodity Bundling and Agenda Control in the Public Sector
建立分析模型，研究公共部门中议程设定者如何通过商品捆绑控制政府单位的预算分配，以操纵选举结果，并探讨两种制度结构下这种垄断权力对预算总额、预算构成和集体行动净收益分配的影响。
In the public sector, commodity bundling involves an agenda setter exercising control over a governmental unit's budgetary mixâ€âthe allocation of the unit's total budget to its various subactivitiesâ€âin order to manipulate electoral outcomes on other fiscal variables such as the total budget. This paper develops an analytical model of a political market in which a multi-activity governmental unit practices commodity bundling in order to advance the interests of the setter. Two institutional structures are considered, each involving a different voting process or set of electoral constraints and, hence, a different form of commodity bundling. The paper explores the impact of this form of monopoly power on such policy outcomes as the governmental unit's total budget, its budgetary mix, and the distribution of net benefits from collective action.