Perfect Equilibria in a Negotiation Model
扩展了Rubinstein的交替出价谈判模型，假设分歧期的收益由标准式博弈决定，发现当玩家足够耐心时存在多重完美均衡（包括低效均衡），延迟时长仅取决于分歧博弈的收益结构而非折现因子。
Rubinstein's alternating-offers bargaining model is enriched by assuming that players' payoffs in disagreement periods are determined by a normal form game. It is shown that such a model can have multiple perfect equilibria, including inefficient ones, provided that players are sufficiently patient. Delay is possible even though there is perfect information and the players are fully rational. The length of delay depends only on the payoff structure of the disagreement game and not on the discount factor. Not all feasible and individually rational payoffs of the disagreement game can be supported as average disagreement payoffs. Indeed, some negotiation games have a unique perfect equilibrium with immediate agreement.