Audit Committee Incentive Compensation and Accounting Restatements*
研究审计委员会成员的短期和长期激励薪酬是否影响公司发生会计重述的可能性，发现短期激励增加重述风险，长期激励也意外地增加重述风险，对审计委员会薪酬设计提出疑问。
This study investigates whether incentive-based compensation for audit committee members is associated with accounting restatements. We use an agency framework to predict that short-term (long-term) incentive compensation for audit committee members will increase (decrease) the likelihood of accounting restatements due to error or fraud. Using a matched-sample logistic regression with 153 restatement and 153 nonrestatement companies, we find the predicted positive relation between short-term incentive compensation (short-term stock option grants) for audit committee members and likelihood of restatement. However, the long-term incentive compensation results contradict prediction and indicate a significant positive relation between audit committee member long-term incentive compensation {long-term stock option grants) and restatement likelihood. Supplemental testing provides evidence that the findings generally are robust to numerous alternative measures and models. The results raise questions about stock option grants for audit committee members and suggest the need for additional theoretical and empirical research to clarify the audit committee's role and incentives in agency frameworks.