Alternative Common-Value Auction Procedures: Revenue Comparisons with Free Entry
研究当参与者数量内生决定时，不同共同价值拍卖程序的收入比较，发现间接竞争可能带来更高预期收入，并给出了标准拍卖程序的完整收入排序。
The logic of revenue comparisons for different types of common-value auctions is substantially altered if the number of participants, rather than being fixed, responds endogenously to the expected profitability from participating. In a thoroughly symmetric model, a seller may prefer that competition be indirect: an auction procedure in which fewer participants are needed to drive the expected profitability from participating down to the level obtainable in other auctions in the economy can attain higher expected revenue if a sale is sufficiently likely. This insight allows a complete, revenue ranking of standard auction procedures, with endogenous entry. Copyright 1990 by University of Chicago Press.