The CMS Auction: Experimental Studies of a Median-Bid Procurement Auction with Nonbinding Bids
实验比较了CMS拍卖（中位定价+非约束性投标）与排除投标拍卖，发现CMS拍卖无法产生竞争性价格且无法满足需求，效率显著低于排除投标拍卖。
We report on the experimental results of simple auctions with (i) a median-bid pricing rule and (ii) nonbinding bids (winning bids can be withdrawn)—the two central pillars of the competitive bidding program designed by the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS). Comparisons between the performance of the CMS auction and the performance of the excluded-bid auction reveal the problematic nature of the CMS auction. The CMS auction fails to generate competitive prices of goods and fails to satisfy demand. In all proposed efficiency measures, we find the excluded-bid auction significantly outperforms the CMS auction.