Monopsony and the Lifetime Relation between Wages and Productivity
通过一个两期模型，假设企业拥有买方垄断权力，分析工资与生产率的关系，发现资深员工工资等于其边际产品，而初级员工工资低于其边际产品，差额取决于企业劳动力供给弹性。
We consider the relation between wages and productivity by means of a model based on the following assumptions. Workers live for 2 periods, firms live forever, senior workers differ nontrivially from junior, seniority enhances workers’ expected second-period earnings, both firms" and workers recognize the prospect of promotion and the senior-junior wage differential at the time of hiring, and firms have monopsony power in hiring junior workers. We show that senior wages are equal to the senior marginal product, but junior wages are set below the junior marginal product by an amount that depends on the elasticity of the firm’s labor supply.