Second Sourcing and the Experience Curve: Price Competition in Defense Procurement
建立了一个动态价格竞争模型，结合经验曲线、不对称成本信息和更高成本的替代系统，分析国防采购中如何设计合同以最小化政府成本并激励开发商披露真实成本信息。
We examine a dynamic model ofprice competition in defense procurement that incorporates the experience curve, asymmetric cost information, and the availability of a higher cost alternative system. We model acquisition as a two-stage process in which initial production is governed by a contract between the government and the developer. Competition is then introduced by an auction in which a second source bids against the developer for remaining production. We characterize the class of production contracts that are cost minimizing for the government and that induce the developer to reveal private cost information. When high costs are revealed, these contracts result in a credible cutoff of new system production in favor of the still higher cost alternative system.