A Theory of Preemptive Takeover Bidding
构建了一个收购竞价模型，其中竞标者在竞价开始后可获取高成本信息。模型解释了竞标者为何会开出高溢价（先发制人）的初始报价，而非低价起拍再视竞争加价，并分析了竞标者与目标公司利润、初始报价、单/多竞标者竞争及收购立法的影响。
This article develops a model of the takeover bidding process. The model can be described as a form of auction in which a bidder can acquire costly information after the bidding has begun. Implications concerning the interrelationships between bidders' and targets' profits, bidders' initial offers, single and multiple bidder contests, and the effects of takeover legislation are developed. Additionally, the model provides a rationale for bidders to make high premium (preemptive) initial bids, rather than making low initial bids and raising them if there is competition.