The Capital Structure of a Regulated Firm
用序贯监管模型分析受监管企业的均衡价格、投资和资本结构，发现资本结构显著影响监管价格，企业会策略性选择债务和股权来影响监管结果，债务能提高监管价格、缓解监管机会主义，但投资不足问题依然存在。
We examine the equilibrium price, investment, and capital structure of a regulated firm using a sequential model of regulation. We show that the firm's capital structure has a significant effect on the regulated price. Consequently, the firm chooses its equity and debt strategically to affect the outcome of the regulatory process. In equilibrium, the firm issues a positive amount of debt and the likelihood of bankruptcy is positive. Debt raises the regulated price, thus mitigating regulatory opportunism. However, underinvestment due to lack of regulatory commitment to prices persists in equilibrium.