Division Director Versus CEO Compensation: New Insights Into the Determinants of Executive Pay
研究利用未多元化企业CEO与大型企业部门总监的任务相似性，分析监控与激励薪酬之间的权衡，发现部门总监因受上级监控而获得更少的激励薪酬和总薪酬，而多元化程度增加会改变这一关系。
The authors highlight the importance of firm structure for the optimal compensation contracts of upper-management positions. Making use of task similarity between CEOs of undiversified firms and division directors within larger corporations, the authors analyze trade-offs between monitoring and incentive pay at below-CEO levels. Because division directors are subject to an additional layer of monitoring by upper management, they should receive less incentive pay and lower compensation than do CEOs of undiversified firms, whereas added complexity because of higher levels of diversification will predictably alter these relationships. Matched pair regressions on a unique data set support the authors' hypotheses.