Regulation and Long-Term Contracting in us Natural Gas Markets
研究了美国天然气行业生产商与管道公司之间的合同问题，发现最低购买条款在不确定市场中普遍存在，但分阶段放松监管可能加剧合同调整困难。
This paper addresses the recent experience of the US natural gas industry with contracting and regulation-the so-called between producers and pipelines. We develop a simple model of contracting between a single buyer and seller, emphasizing the determination of price and minimum-purchase (take-or-pay) provisions. We find that take-or-pay provisions are likely to emerge in regulated and unregulated markets characterized by uncertainty, but that phased deregulation may well exacerbate the problem of contract adjustment. Our model is supported by empirical evidence drawn from recent samples of contracts between wellhead producers and pipelines.