Private Predecision Information, Performance Measure Congruity, and the Value of Delegation*
用线性合同框架研究代理人激励合同中的绩效衡量与代理人私人决策前信息的关系如何影响授权决策权的价值，为绩效衡量缺陷与代理成本之间的联系提供新见解。
Abstract We use a linear contracting framework to study how the relation between performance measures used in an agent's incentive contract and the agent's private predecision information affects the value of delegating decision rights to the agent. The analysis relies on the idea that available performance measures are often imperfect representations of the economic consequences of managerial actions and decisions, and this, along with gaming possibilities provided to the agent by access to private predecision information, may overwhelm any benefits associated with delegation. Our analytical framework allows us to derive intuitive conditions under which delegation does and does not have value, and to provide new insights into the linkage between imperfections in performance measurement and agency costs.