Does Pay‐for‐Performance Strain the Employment Relationship? The Effect of Manager Bonus Eligibility on Nonmanagement Employee Turnover
基于代理理论和公平理论，研究管理者绩效薪酬对非管理员工离职的组织层面影响，发现管理者绩效薪酬会损害雇佣关系、增加员工离职，除非有培训和管理者善待员工的激励措施。
We tested the organization‐level effects of manager pay‐for‐performance practices on nonmanagement employee turnover within the context of agency theory and equity theory—two frameworks commonly applied to understand compensation policy and practice. We also propose an alternative theoretical perspective that predicts that managerial pay‐for‐performance policies may strain the employment relationship and increase nonmanagement employee turnover, unless there are HR practices that train and incentivize managers to treat employees well. We compare these alternative models to establish how well each framework explains the observed effects. Agency theory and equity theory receive limited empirical support in our lagged panel data set of organizations, whereas broader empirical support is established for the strain effect of manager pay‐for‐performance on the employment relationship. We discuss the implications of our findings for compensation theory, research, and practice.