The Design and Performance of Sharing Rules for a Partnership in Continuous Time
研究连续时间下合伙人之间重复博弈的分享规则设计，分析在信息不完全且风险中性时，如何实现帕累托有效的稳定均衡。
We study repeated partnerships with imperfect monitoring and risk neutrality. The interval between the partners' decisions, the delay, is given but can be arbitrarily small. Each stage-game's output is Gaussian, with mean and variance depending on the partners' actions, making the sequence of outcomes a discretization of a diffusion. A sharing rule is efficient if there is an equilibrium of the corresponding game whose outcomes are Pareto efficient; it is stable if these equilibria approach a limit as the delay approaches zero. We characterize partnerships for which there exist stable, efficient sharing rules, and describe the corresponding equilibria.Journal of Economic LiteratureClassification Numbers: C73, D2, D82.