Bank Holding Company Characteristics and the Upstreaming of Bank Funds: Note
研究银行控股公司中，子公司向母公司上缴资金（如超额分红或收费）的行为，并首次系统分析影响这一行为的控股公司特征，对银行监管者识别风险有参考价值。
The premise of integration underlies the current trend in the regulatory approach to bank holding companies (BHCs), reflecting the supervisors' concern that financial problems may be transferred among affiliates to the detriment of the subsidiary banks. There are several ways by which this may be accomplished, but the one that is central to this study is for the parent to require its banking subsidiaries to pay dividends beyond what would normally be considered pradent (in terms of the banks' own needs for internally generated capital) or to levy fees in excess of the value of services it provides them. Evidence was reported in [6] that banks affiliated with holding companies have followed significantly more liberal dividend policies in recent years than have comparable independent banks. The present investigation extends the prior study and represents the first attempt to analyze intraholding company funds flows for a large number of banks in a systematic fashion. The specific bypothesis tested states that there are observable characteristics of a holding company system, such as the financing techniques of the parent and the comparative importance of nonbanking organizations within the group, that are influential in determining the degree of upstreaming of funds by banking subsidiaries to the parent firm. Since such payments have the potential for adversely affecting a bank's capital position and its soundness, the identification of variables related to these payments should be important to regulators in their surveillance of banking firms.