Monetary Integration and Economic Reform
用契约理论分析货币一体化，指出国家间货币政策协调存在负溢出效应导致高通胀，而事前经济改革有正溢出效应；研究货币联盟能否替代无法签订事前契约的困境。
Recent research in contract theory views ownership as a substitute for complete contracts. Here, this approach is applied to monetary integration. Countries face a coordination problem conducting monetary policy. Negative spillovers ensure uncoordinated policy generates too high inflation. Ex ante, policy makers can undertake politically costly economic reform. This has a positive spillover because it improves the outcome of the monetary policy game. Ex‐post contracting over policy may be possible, but it supposed that ex‐ante contracting over reform and monetary policy is not. This paper analyses when monetary union is a good substitute for this inability to commit.