Incentive Strength and Teacher Productivity: Evidence from a Group-Based Teacher Incentive Pay System
研究基于小组的教师激励薪酬计划中激励强度对学生成绩的影响，发现激励增强时受激励考试的成绩提升，但效果随教师负责学生比例增加而递减，对低成就学生群体效果更显著。
We estimate the impact of incentive strength on achievement under a group-based teacher incentive pay program. The system provides variation in the share of students in a subject-grade that a teacher instructs, which proxies for incentive strength. We find that achievement on incentivized exams, but not nonincentivized exams, improves when incentives strengthen. For the incentivized exams, we find that effects fade out monotonically as a teacher's portion of the group increases to between 20 and 30 percentage and are larger for teachers with low-achieving students. Calculations based off these estimates show modest positive effects of the program overall. © 2015 The President and Fellows of Harvard College and the Massachusetts Institute of Technology