Collusion in Ocean Shipping: A Test of Monopoly and Empty Core Models
提出合谋是为了在存在可避免固定成本且核心为空的市场中施加均衡，通过班轮公会数据比较空核模型与卡特尔模型，发现证据支持空核理论。
In markets with avoidable fixed costs, the core may be empty. The author argues that a reason for collusion is to impose an equilibrium where none exists. He sets up a framework for deriving testable implications from the model and compares those implications with those of a cartel model. The author compares the two models empirically with data from liner shipping conferences, legal collusive agreements that have been in force for over a century, and concludes that the evidence supports the theory of the core. Copyright 1989 by University of Chicago Press.