Information and Control in Ventures and Alliances
构建了一个理论模型，将控制权视为目标一致性的信号，并应用于投资者与有私人信息的企业家之间的金融契约。研究发现，正式控制权随事前信息不对称、事后不确定性以及企业家激励冲突的增加而增加，随企业家资源的增加而减少；而实际控制权随信息不对称的增加而减少。控制权在不利状态下会转移给投资者。
ABSTRACT This paper develops a theory of control as a signal of congruence of objectives, and applies it to financial contracting between an investor and a privately informed entrepreneur. We show that formal investor control is (i) increasing in the information asymmetries ex ante, (ii) increasing in the uncertainty surrounding the venture ex post, (iii) decreasing in the entrepreneur's resources, and (iv) increasing in the entrepreneur's incentive conflict. In contrast, real investor control—that is, actual investor interference—is decreasing in information asymmetries. Control rights are further such that control shifts to the investor in bad states of nature.