On the Efficiency of the Rank‐Order Contract under Moral Hazard and Adverse Selection
分析在有限个风险中性代理人同时存在道德风险和逆向选择时，排名合同的效率。研究发现最优结果可通过惩罚少数代理人但惩罚力度大的排名合同实现，并比较了这类合同与少数人获大奖的合同，最后解释了为何企业晋升政策中较少采用惩罚型排名合同。
This article analyzes the efficiency of the rank-order contract for a finite number of risk-neutral agents under both moral hazard and adverse selection. The first-best outcome is shown to be supported by a set of rank-order contracts which penalize a small fraction of agents but do so heavily. The article also shows how these rank-order contracts compare with those giving a large prize to few agents. Finally, the article provides an informal argument for why firms do not follow a penalty-giving rank-order contract in their promotion policies as often as the theory predicts. Copyright 1997 by University of Chicago Press.