Failed Bank Resolution and the Collateral Crunch: The Advantages of Adopting Transferable Puts
指出当前失败银行处置方式因政府与收购方合同激励扭曲，导致过多贷款止赎，提出引入可转让看跌期权以市场激励改善资产处置，对政策制定者和银行监管者有用。
Current methods of failed bank resolution are unnecessarily expensive for taxpayers and impose substantial costs on borrowers at failed banks. This situation is the result of distorted incentives imbedded in the standard contract between the government and acquirers of failed banks, which result in more loan foreclosures than if the loan were held by a well‐capitalized bank. This paper proposes a modification to the standard contract in the form of a transferable put, which would introduce market‐based incentives to the disposition of failed bank assets.