Financing a Portfolio of Projects
证明，为项目组合融资的投资者可以利用资金深度克服创业者的激励问题；再融资阶段对稀缺知情资本的竞争增强了投资者的议价地位，而资金有限的投资者所投项目需有更高的净现值，这有助于理解风险投资中限制基金初始资本等条款。
This article shows that investors financing a portfolio of projects may use the depth of their financial pockets to overcome entrepreneurial incentive problems. Competition for scarce informed capital at the refinancing stage strengthens investors' bargaining positions. And yet, entrepreneurs' incentives may be improved, because projects funded by investors with “shallow pockets” must have not only a positive net present value at the refinancing stage, but one that is higher than that of competing portfolio projects. Our article may help understand provisions used in venture capital finance that limit a fund'sinitial capital and make it difficult to add more capital once the initial venture capital fund is raised. , Oxford University Press.