Intertemporal Cost Allocation and Managerial Investment Incentives: A Theory Explaining the Use of Economic Value Added as a Performance Measure
分析当管理层薪酬基于包含投资支出分配的会计收益时，不同分配规则如何影响投资激励，发现唯一能始终引导经理选择有效投资水平的分配规则对应经济增加值指标。
This paper provides a formal analysis of how managerial investment incentives are affected by alternative allocation rules when managerial compensation is based on accounting measures of income that include allocations for investment expenditures. The main result is that there exists a unique allocation rule that always induces the manager to choose the efficient investment level. The income measure created by this allocation rule is usually referred to as residual income or economic value added. Copyright 1997 by the University of Chicago.