Free banking and the stability of early joint-stock banking
研究早期股份制银行是否采用自由银行制度，发现采用该制度的系统不稳定，而受监管的系统通常稳定，并将监管成功归因于解决银行企业时间不一致问题的务实方案。
Proponents of free banking argue that systems adopting their policies will be stable. In this paper, we present evidence suggesting that, in general, early joint-stock banking systems did not adopt free banking, and those that did proved to be unstable. In particular, we demonstrate that those systems imposing regulations were generally stable. We rationalise the success of regulation as a pragmatic solution to the time-inconsistency problem arising from the peculiar nature of the banking firm. Notably, we find that the 'golden age' of free banking stability can be attributed to restrictions on the organisational form of the early banking firm. Copyright 2004, Oxford University Press.