Who bribes? Evidence from the United Nations' oil‐for‐food program
利用联合国对伊拉克制裁下的石油换食品计划数据，分析企业行贿的供给方因素，发现财务和管理激励促使企业支付更大额贿赂，而母国实施经合组织反贿赂公约则减少贿赂。
Abstract How do managers react in an environment where bribery is likely to bring high rewards, but also presents high risks? We examine the supply side (firms' illicit payments) of bribery in a global setting, using the United Nations' (UN) Oil‐for‐Food Program, part of UN sanctions on Iraq. Some companies helped Iraq circumvent UN sanctions through bribe payments in the form of illicit surcharges. Our transaction‐level analysis of factors affecting bribe payments draws on the economic theory of crime, agency theory, and home country institutions. Results suggest that firms pay larger bribes when there are stronger financial and managerial incentives, but pay less when their home countries have implemented the OECD Anti‐Bribery Convention. We find little relationship between a widely used country‐level corruption perception index and firms' actual bribery. Copyright © 2012 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.