Renegotiation and Optimality in Agency Contracts
分析隐藏行动委托代理模型中的重新谈判，由代理人发起，并对委托人信念施加精炼条件，发现均衡配置与无重新谈判时的次优结果一致，且事前有效。
We analyse renegotiation in a hidden action principal-agent model. Contract renegotiation offers are made by the agent. A refinement is imposed on the principal's beliefs: if precisely one action is optimal with respect to both the principal's and the agent's contracts, the principal believes that that action has been taken. With the refinement imposed, perfect-Bayesian equilibrium allocations are identical to the second best in the classical principal-agent model without renegotiation. When renegotiation is led by the agent and when equilibria satisfy the refinement, equilibrium allocations are ex ante efficient.