Institutions of Foreign Exchange Settlement in a Two-Country Model
在Freeman(1996)模型基础上，探讨三种制度设计（基于央行免费日内信贷的支付对支付结算、可转让存单机构、货币联盟）能否像Fujiki(2003)那样提升货币均衡效率。
Fujiki (2003) extends the Freeman (1996) model to show that when combined, an elastic money supply in the foreign exchange market and an elastic money supply in the domestic credit market yield efficiency gains in monetary equilibrium. This paper discusses whether three other institutional designs could achieve the same improvement in efficiency: (1) a private arrangement based on a payment versus a payment settlement standard supported by central banks' free intraday credit, (2) a financial institution that provides a negotiable certificate of deposit, and (3) a currency union.