Coalition-Proofness and Correlation with Arbitrary Communication Possibilities
证明，在允许个体偏离的任意联盟通信设定下，若策略集中存在帕累托最优元素，则存在联盟稳健的相关均衡；该元素在策略互补性博弈中存在于特定条件下。
The ability of the members of a coalition to communicate secretly determines whether the coalition can coordinate to deviate from a proposed strategy and thus affects which strategies are “coalition proof.” We show that the existence of a Pareto-best element in the set of strategies that survive iterated elimination of dominated strategies implies the existence of a coalition-proof correlated equilibrium for any specification of coalitional communication possibilities that always permits individual deviations. Such an element exists in games with strategic complementarities if either (1) there is a unique Nash equilibrium or (2) each player's payoff is nondecreasing in the others' strategies.Journal of Economic Literatureclassification number: C72.