Differential information in large games with strategic complementarities
研究了具有差异信息的大规模战略互补博弈，定义了分布贝叶斯纳什均衡并证明其存在，刻画了均衡集的序性质，提供了比较静态分析和计算极值均衡的算法，并应用于骚乱博弈、选美比赛和共同价值拍卖。
We study equilibrium in large games of strategic complementarities (GSC) with differential information. We define an appropriate notion of distributional Bayesian Nash equilibrium and prove its existence. Furthermore, we characterize order-theoretic properties of the equilibrium set, provide monotone comparative statics for ordered perturbations of the space of games, and provide explicit algorithms for computing extremal equilibria. We complement the paper with new results on the existence of Bayesian Nash equilibrium in the sense of Balder and Rustichini (J Econ Theory 62(2): 385-393, 1994) or Kim and Yannelis (J Econ Theory 77(2):330-353, 1997) for large GSC and provide an analogous characterization of the equilibrium set as in the case of distributional Bayesian Nash equilibrium. Finally, we apply our results to riot games, beauty contests, and common value auctions. In all cases, standard existence and comparative statics tools in the theory of supermodular games for finite numbers of agents do not apply in general, and new constructions are required.