Licensing in the Theory of Innovation
分析非合作研发博弈中的技术许可，探讨许可激励及其对创新模式、行业成本和市场结构的影响，发现双寡头下许可在初始技术相近时促进研发、不对称时抑制研发。
This article analyzes licensing in a noncooperative R&D game. We ask two questions. What are the incentives for licensing a production technology and what is the impact of licensing on the pattern of innovation and the consequent evolution of industry costs and market structure? The gainsfrom trading information through licensing contracts are achieved through the replacement of inefficient production techniques (the ex post incentive) and the elimination of inefficient research expenditures (the ex ante incentive). In a duopoly the availability of licensing encourages research when the firms' initial production technologies are close in costs and discourages research when initial costs are asymmetric.